In my talk, I will investigate the question whether the ontological view that there are necessary connections has an influence on the resolvability of the problem of induction. The general idea I will criticise is that if we observed F to be G, and there is a necessary connection between F-ness and G-ness, we are justified in inferring that future or unobserved F will also be G, since they simply could not be otherwise. I will argue that such attempts to justify induction by introducing necessary connections fail. We still need an ampliative inference of some sort to discover that there even exists a necessary connection that could warrant such a reduction. That inference again needs to be justified. Moreover, the proposed justification is only applicable for a small subset of inductive inferences, if at all.

The necessitarian strategy to solve the problem of induction seems to depend on an unnecessarily strong reading of what a justification of induction could be. I will try to disentangle the various extant accounts of what could count as a justification and argue that such a standard for justification as the necessitarians employ cannot be met.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.

nächster Vortrag: 16.11.
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Bürgerliche Familie und Staat: Rousseau, Hegel, Humboldt

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