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Why Constitutive Accounts of Practical Reason Cannot Account for Our Kind of Agency

We are capable of a sort of double consciousness: we can regard something as appealing, worth doing, desirable, etc., even as we also occupy a point of view from which we call this appearance into question; we can experience our circumstances as calling for a certain response, even as we believe that we lack sufficient reason to respond this way. I argue that constitutivist accounts of practical reason cannot do justice to this possibility. On these accounts, the point of view we occupy insofar as we aim to determine what we have reason to do (the “deliberative point of view”) and the point of view we occupy insofar as we are the subject of pro- and con-attitudes are inaccessible to each other; they are not points of view that a single person can occupy at the same time. This means that we must reject constitutivist accounts of practical reason.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.

nächster Vortrag: 5.7.  
Béatrice Liemann, Universität Frankfurt am Main  
Zwei kontroverse Annahmen in Aristoteles' Behandlung von Willentlichkeit  
und in seiner Konzeption der Zurechnung

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