Prof. Dr. Gianfranco Soldati  
Université de Fribourg

**Appearances and Illusions**

This paper deals with the nature of perceptual appearances. It argues that they are objective relational properties of external objects. In perceptual experience, we are acquainted with such appearances. These are not sense-data, as usually understood, and they are not identical to the properties we attribute to external objects with the usage of qualitative concepts such as *red*, *square* and *sweet*. We use such concepts in order to describe properties that are manifest in perception, not in order to describe appearances. One and the same property, such as the bent shape of a stick, can appear in different ways in different contexts. None of those ways is more or less appropriate, because things simply appear the way they do. The choice of a certain context determines the normal conditions for the possession of qualitative concepts. Standard perceptual illusions are perceptual experiences. They mislead us, not because they are not correct, but because they prompt us to use concepts that are not appropriate under the prevailing conditions.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.

Prof. Dr. Sarah Buss, University of Michigan  
*Why Constitutive Accounts of Practical Reason Cannot Account for Our Kind of Agency*