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**Dimensions of Doubt: On Suspension of Judgment**

We often suspend belief. Some questions we haven’t considered yet, others are still under investigation, and yet others seem to allow for no definite answer. We often withhold belief and, more importantly, we do so rationally. Despite its core role in our doxastic everyday life, suspension of belief has not received much attention in the epistemological literature which has focused on positive belief alone. In this talk, I will move the focus from belief to non-belief and argue that the merely negative characterization of suspension of belief as the absence of both belief and disbelief is crucially insufficient. Doxastic suspense requires a number of relevantly different, equally legitimate specifications. I will present a plethora of phenomena which fall under the concept of suspension of belief, and sketch some possible consequences for our conceptions of theoretical and practical rationality.