Between anger and radical hope: emotions in progress
In moral, political and social philosophy, debates around progress have always been heated. These debates seem to reveal, more and more clearly, that theories of progress are entangled in a sort of double bind: arguments in favor of progress are unable to avoid positions that undermine progress itself, but rejection of progress risks to give in to reactionary, cynical or melancholic positions. Can normative practical philosophy give up on this notion?

I formulate the hypothesis that the double bind depends on a too strong normative commitment, namely on an unhealthy ‘obsession’ with normative criteria or standards for progress. As a corrective, I propose an account of progress that is based on what I call fraught normativity, namely on a reflection on the desirability of moral, social and political changes that can account for conflicts, ambivalences, grey areas, uncertainty (1). This normative account can be better elaborated, I argue, by taken into consideration the (individual and collective, or shared) political emotions that move, block, emerge from changes. As paradigmatic examples, I concentrate on anger and hope. To this goal, I present and elaborate on Maria Lugones’ seminal work on first-order and second-order anger as well Jonathan Lear’s reflections on radical hope (2).

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.