Fachbereichskolloquium
Donnerstags 17 bis 1830 Uhr, Raum G307

Im Rahmen des Philosophischen Kolloquiums findet am Donnerstag, dem 16.11.2023 folgender Vortrag statt:

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Austin and Kripke:
Making Sense of Contingent A Priori Truths

Kripke famously claims in Naming and Necessity (1980) that there are some contingent truths that might, nevertheless, be known a priori. His claim is a consequence of some theses regarding rigidity of proper names and some features of stipulative reference-fixing. Some critics (e.g., Donnellan, Salmon and Soames) argue that there could not be knowledge properly speaking in Kripke’s alleged examples unless some sort of perceptual contact has taken place between the stipulator and the reference of proper names (which thereby destroys the credentials of his cases as genuine instances of a priori knowledge).

My aim is to sketch a way of looking at Kripke’s examples that differs from most accounts in the literature and that can survive this sort of criticism: I propose an approach based on the analysis of what must be involved in the illocutionary act behind the stipulations that generate Kripke’s cases. Using the resources of speech act theory, especially as presented in Austin (1962) and Searle and Vanderveken’s (1985), I shall investigate the special illocutionary act involved in stipulative reference-fixing. As I argued in previous work (Ruffino 2021, 2022), this approach can also fill out some gaps in Kripke’s original discussion (and that have been largely ignored in the literature on the issue).

I shall also consider a line of argument recently raised by Stalnaker (2021) that looks at Kripke’s cases from a perspective similar to the one that I suggest but comes to the opposite conclusion. As I shall argue, this line of argument does not fully appreciate the specific kind of illocutionary act involved in those cases.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.