Moral Beliefs, Slurs, Truth Conditions, and Ways of Thinking

Moral naturalism claims there are important similarities between moral thought and talk and ordinary thought and talk about the natural world. Crucially, it says there is a natural property that is identical with wrongness – one that could in principle be referred to with a naturalistic concept. Say that this is the concept of N-wrongness. But there are also important differences. There are at least three to notice. First, moral facts and properties are normative in a way that (other) natural facts and properties are not. Moreover, moral concepts are normative in a way that ordinary naturalistic “descriptive” concepts are not. The concept of moral wrongness is normative. The concept of being widespread is not, nor, importantly, is the concept of being N-wrong.

Second, moral talk, and perhaps also moral thought, is expressive of attitudes that do not seem to be expressed in ordinary naturalistic talk and thought. In saying that torture is wrong, and perhaps also in thinking this, I express my rejection of torture and my opposition to it. In saying that torture is N-wrong, I do not do this. Third, unlike ordinary descriptive factual beliefs, moral belief has the fundamental role of motivating action (Copp 2018). These differences between moral thought and talk and ordinary thought and talk about the natural world are the focus of this talk.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.

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