Im Rahmen des Philosophischen Kolloquiums findet am **Donnerstag, 1. Juli**, folgender Vortrag statt:

**Susanne Burri**  
Universität Konstanz

**A Subjective Impermissibility Account of Liability to Defensive Harm**

If a person becomes liable to defensive harm, she forfeits some of her usual rights against being harmed, thus having her moral status at least temporarily reduced. This paper argues that an agent becomes liable to defensive harm just in case she (i) acts subjectively impermissibly because her actions show insufficient respect for a morally protected good, and (ii) her actions do, in fact, threaten the morally protected good she subjectively disrespects. An agent acts subjectively impermissibly just in case she acts impermissibly in light of her beliefs, her available evidence, or both. I contend that the liability account that I develop in this paper is superior to both the so-called Moral Responsibility Account as well as the so-called Moral Status Account because it accommodates the thought that an agent who abides by the requirements of morality as she is able to perceive them should thereby immunise herself against a lowering of her moral status. Accounts that imply otherwise are thereby committed to the existence of an objectionable kind of moral luck. The account that I defend differs from culpability accounts of liability by not making culpability a necessary condition of liability. I argue that this is as it should be: culpability accounts are overly focused on the agent who has her moral status reduced, and pay only insufficient attention to the good that her actions threaten. I defend my proposed account against two objections: first, that it has counterintuitive implications in particular cases, and second, that it fails to provide helpful guidance to potential victims who need to know whether they may permissibly defend themselves.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.

nächster und letzter Vortrag im SS 2021: 15. Juli  
Mount, Beau  
*Leibniz and the Logical Problem of the Trinity*