Leibniz and the Logical Problem of the Trinity

I discuss Leibniz's response to what is sometimes termed the 'logical' problem of the Trinity. I argue that Leibniz had a coherent and consistent answer to the problem, which involved positing three divine persons (substance-like objects, but not true substances) alongside a single absolute substance.

After setting out the metaphysical background to this picture, I propose that Leibnizian divine persons are best understood as objectual relation-instances ('tropes') corresponding to self-relations of the absolute, maximally perfect substance.

I then criticize an alternative interpretation of Leibniz's Trinitarian doctrine due to Maria Rosa Antognazza: I argue that it either fails to solve the logical problem or reduces to a view structurally akin to the one I present.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.