Im Rahmen des Philosophischen Kolloquiums findet am Donnerstag, 22. April, folgender Vortrag statt:

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Suspension of judgment: a unified approach

Consider the proposition that it was raining when Napoleon arrived at St. Helena. Traditionally, it is thought that there are three basic ways to respond doxastically to this or any other proposition. If asked whether or not a proposition is true, an epistemic subject can either believe that it is true, disbelieve that it is true or suspend with respect to its truth. In this talk, I will be concerned about suspending judgment, or as it is often called, the third doxastic stance.

In the last two decades, different suggestions have been made about the nature of doxastic suspension. For example, some philosophers think of suspension as a meta-cognitive attitude, whereas others think of it as sui generis attitude; some take suspension to be an inquiry-opening attitude, whereas others say that it is inquiry-closing; some think that suspension is a permanent stance, whereas others think it is only a temporary phenomenon.

I will provide an analysis that allows for different kinds of suspension and I will explain why all of these, even if they appear to be very different, fall under the same genus. I will argue that suspending can be generally understood as the mental activity of bringing some mental object to a halt. Depending on the respective mental object that is brought to a stop, different outcomes, e.g. doxastic states, will result.

I will also show that this analysis can be applied to the different roles of doxastic suspension within Cartesian and Pyrrhonian Scepticism.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.