Im Rahmen des Philosophischen Kolloquiums findet am Donnerstag, den 07. Juli 2022 folgender Vortrag statt:

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The cognitive collapse of mental fictionalism revisited

Mental fictionalism is a fairly recent position in the philosophy of mind that views folk psychological discourse about the mind as a fictional discourse. When people make folk psychological claims (e.g., attribute mental states), they do not incur the commitments that would follow from the literal interpretation of those claims. Although folk psychology is a fictional story rather than a true story, mental fictionalists insist that we should nevertheless keep it as it has non-epistemic or pragmatic utility. A widespread objection to mental fictionalism is that it leads to the cognitive collapse: it contradicts itself since already the very formulation of the position presupposes folk psychological notions (for one cannot explain what it takes to engage in a fictional discourse without using mental vocabulary).

The consensus seems to be that the cognitive collapse is not a serious worry: the objection begs the question against mental fictionalism just like an older but similar objection against eliminative materialism. In the talk, I reconsider the case against mental fictionalism and argue that the threat is indeed serious. Attempts to reply to the objection present a dilemma for mental fictionalism: either “meaning” and “fiction” are folk psychological terms or not. If they are, then mental fictionalism is inexpressible. If they are not, then mental fictionalism cannot be currently understood.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.