It is generally accepted that sight—the capacity to see or to have visual experiences—has the power to give us knowledge about things in the environment and some of their properties in a distinctive way. Seeing the goose puts me in a position to know that it’s there and that it’s, say, brown, large, maybe even that it’s angry. And it does this by, when all goes well, presenting us with these features. It has sometimes been suggested that taste lacks this sight-like epistemological power. I will argue that taste has epistemological power of the same kind as sight’s, but that as a matter of contingent fact, that power often goes unexercised. We can know about things by tasting them in the same kind of way as we can know about things by seeing them, but we often don’t. I then consider the significance of this conclusion. I’ll suggest that in one way, it matters little, because our primary interest in taste isn’t epistemic but aesthetic. But, I will argue, it can matter ethically.