Inferential Expressivism as a Theory of Meaning

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Abstract:

In this talk, I will detail a theory of meaning called "Inferential Expressivism" according to which the meaning of a linguistic item is given by which *attitudes* (of the speaker) one can *infer* from the *use* of the item. This stands in contrast to the classical conception of meaning as truth-condition. The talk will begin with a gentle introduction to use-theories of meaning (in contrast to the truth-conditional paradigm). As an application, I will show how Inferential Expressivism can give a satisfying and motivated account of the epistemic modal "might", accounting for the following data: The following sound bad:

(1) It is raining and it might not be raining.
(2) Suppose it is raining and it might not be raining.
(3) Any ticket might be a winner, but this one is a loser.

But this sounds good:

(4) Any ticket might be the winner, but some ticket is a loser.

If time permits, I will also sketch inferential expressivist accounts of indicative conditionals and/or moral language.