Knowing that I am in Pain

How do you know that you are in pain? Surprisingly, although pain is the philosopher’s favorite example of a sensation, the question has received little sustained attention from philosophers. Part of the explanation might be that some philosophers think that it is in the very nature of pain to make itself known, in which case it’s unclear what more could be said. Another part of the explanation might be that some other philosophers, under the influence of Wittgenstein, think that talk of “knowledge” here is misplaced. As Wittgenstein famously said: “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?” Against both groups of philosophers, the paper argues for a substantive epistemological account, one that fits well with the contemporary scientific understanding of pain, although it fits badly with “commonsense”.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.