Causality and objectivity in social science and policy

Social scientists who aim to justify social policy decisions tend to use causal models (models believed to represent relations of direct type-level causation). But the causal models they use often compete in the sense that they define joint probability distributions for competing policy counterfactuals. The question of their objectivity is therefore a pressing issue. In the social sciences (and in many other disciplines), scientific objectivity has been traditionally conceived of as mechanical objectivity or value-independence. A causal model used to inform social policy is objective in the sense of “mechanical objectivity” if the relations of direct type-level causation that it purportedly represents can be shown to exist by application of some mechanical procedure. And it is objective in the sense of “value-independence” if it can be accepted or rejected independently of the non-epistemic values (ideologies, value judgments or group interests) that social scientists happen to endorse. The paper aims to show that scientific objectivity in either sense is unattainable for social scientists, and that a type of objectivity that is attainable for them is what Popper in later writings refers to as “the objectivity of the critical method”.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.