Timothy Williamson (2004, 2007) argues that we ought not appeal to intuitions as evidence because it provokes scepticism. Philosophers do it, he explains, because they misguidedly believe that evidence has to meet an operational standard (2004) or that in principle, evidence should be shared by everyone (2007). In reply to Williamson, I offer an alternative explanation: We appeal to intuitions because of a methodological constraint on evidence in philosophy. I discuss several options of what such a constraint could be and suggest that we ought to appeal to the part of our total evidence which is relatively easy to access. If my explanation is correct, appealing to intuitions has to be understood as part of a more general practice in academic philosophy which is not in need of revision.

Alle Interessierten, insbesondere auch Studierende, sind herzlich eingeladen.

gez.: Prof. Dr. Peter Stemmer