Im Rahmen der Early Lunch Philosophy trägt am

Donnerstag, 15. April 2021, vor:

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(Konstanz)

**Deep Disagreement in Set Theory**

Against the backdrop of an unresolved debate on deep peer disagreement, I propose to study a case of disagreement among set theorists. Based on the results of an interview study, I model a situation, in which an absolutist and a pluralist disagree on framework propositions, for example, over whether independent sentences are about matters of fact. I argue that this is a case of deep disagreement according to Fogelin and according to Lynch, and further, also a case of peer disagreement. Having established these premises, I address the following question: Is it rational to remain steadfast or to suspend judgement? The literature is divided on this issue (see for example Lougheed and Matheson). For the case study, defining rationality in terms of the group epistemic goal of set-theoretic progress is an obvious choice, and I argue in favour of remaining steadfast. However, if we leave the set-theoretic research context and evaluate the situation in terms of the individual epistemic goal of true beliefs, the evaluation changes. From this case study, I conclude that the distinction between group epistemic goals and individual epistemic goals is relevant to the debate, because they can be in tension.