In a recent paper, Mark Schroeder calls attention to the “common subject problem” in ethics: It is unclear how different moral theorists can attain knowledge about what’s wrong in spite of their differences in what they believe about wrongness and in what they inquire about it. For example, given that Kantians think of wrongness in terms of autonomy violations and utilitarians in terms of failures to maximize utility, how could they conceive of each other as being engaged in the inquiry of a common subject matter? Moreover, how can their seemingly entirely distinct moral inquiries produce the same justified beliefs, such as the belief that killing-for-fun is wrong? In order to solve the problem, I propose a unifying (“2D”) semantic conception of moral terms. The general idea is this: There is an aspect of meaning to moral terms — a “conceptual core” — that can be grasped a priori and that explains why different moral theorists are inquiring a common subject matter.