Some things in life can be quite bad and not only in ways that deprive us of good things. Sometimes things are actively bad. I will understand these actively bad things as -being. In order to accommodate ill-being, some Desire-Satisfactionists, defenders of the view that satisfied desires constitute well-being, have argued that there is a second class of attitudes, namely aversions, that determine our ill-being. This is called the aversion view. I will argue that the aversion view is superior to the frustration view, which claims that desire-frustration constitutes our ill-being. The aversion view can accommodate for a conceptual independence of the actively good from the actively bad. Furthermore, I will show that accepting the aversion view has consequences for our choice of the underlying concept of desire as well. I will argue that the behaviour-based concept of desire cannot accommodate the aversion view properly which provides a reason for the Desire-Satisfactionist to reject the behaviour based-concept of desire and embrace a pleasure-based concept of desire.