Im Rahmen der Early Lunch Philosophy trägt am
Donnerstag, 14. Juli 2022, vor:

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Conceptualizing Basic Agency

Generally speaking, action theorists see an agent as an entity that can perform an action. The ‘standard story’ of action has been based on agents that resemble us: agents that have a mental life that is sufficiently developed so as to enable the agent to guide its bodily movement through intentions or reasons. A difficulty is that this ‘standard story’ no longer holds - or cannot be shown to hold - for all the entities that we by now wish to call agents. The standard story, as so many other theories, is inherently anthropocentric. More recent accounts have, therefore, proposed simplified notions of agency often referred to as ‘primitive’ or ‘basic’ agency. A problem with these newer accounts, however, is that they are often still biocentric: agency seems to resemble more than anything a living entity whose actions have to ‘functionally’ make sense to its continued existence. But is agency not more than simply ‘living’ or ‘being alive’? During this talk, I put forward some initial thoughts on whether a non-anthropocentric and non-biocentric notion of basic agency is feasible, and if so, what some of its conditions are. I will further discuss the implications that such an account will have for AI-research.