Doktorandenkolloquium
Jede Woche treffen wir uns, um einen Vortrag zu hören oder einen Artikel zu diskutieren. Wir freuen uns auf eure Teilnahme.
Freitags 11.45 - 13.15 Uhr
Raum D 435
Liste der Vorträge
Sommersemester 2024 DK-Zeitplan (gemeinsam mit Carolin Antos)
16. Februar, Vortrag. Ismael Ordóñez Miguéns (University of Santiago de Compostela), Modal Abstraction and the Frontier of Infinity.
19. April, Vortrag. Bartek Tuta (Universität Konstanz), The old picture of the acquisition of testimonial knowledge and the implications of the criticism of it: A discussion of J. Lackey's paper, Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission (1999)
26. April, Vortrag. Yacin Hamami (ETH Zürich), Understanding mathematical proofs from a planning perspective. Abstract.
3. Mai, Vortrag. Mike Beaney(University of Aberdeen), Pulling and Pushing Mohist Logic. Abstract.
10. Mai, Vortrag. Manfred Kuppfer (Univeristät Konstanz), Variables and Compositionality. Abstract.
24. Mai, Vortrag. Filip Buekens (KU Leuven), Reflections on Frege’s Postcard: How True Propositions differ from Accurate Representations. Abstract.
6. Juni, DONNERSTAG Vortrag. Neil Barton (University of Singapore), Vortragstitel TBA -- von 13:30 - 15:00 im Raum M 901
14. Juni, zwei Vorträge:
- Giorgio Venturi (University of Pisa), Per Aspera ad Astra: from Skolem Paradox to an uncountable universe. Paper inkl. Abstract.
- Philip Welch (University of Bristol), Title TBA
21. Juni, Gemeinsamer Vortrag mit Uni Konstanz Logikkolloquium. Emanuele D’Osualdo (Universität Konstanz), Vortragstitel TBA
28. Juni, Vortrag. Christopher von Bülow (Üniversität Konstanz), Williamson’s Reductio of Bivalence Denials, and Vague Truth Degrees for Borderline Cases.
5. Juli, Vortrag. Sofie Vaas (Üniversität Konstanz), Vortragstitel TBA
Pulling and Pushing Mohist Logic
Wann
Freitag, 3. Mai 2024
11:45 bis 13:15 Uhr
Wo
D 435
Veranstaltet von
Leon Horsten, Carolin Antos, Sam Roberts
Vortragende Person/Vortragende Personen:
Mike Beany (University of Aberdeen)
Abstract
Mohist (Chinese) logic can be seen as concerned with one-step inferences involving the compounding of names—inferences of the form ‘A is B; so FA is FB’. Some of these are good inferences and some are bad, and this lecture will explore the ways in which the Mohists established their claims about the validity or invalidity of such inferences. Their explicit argumentation may seem analytically suspect but on deeper analysis, we can often find arguments that can be defended, or at least can make better sense of what might otherwise seem implausible. Making such sense also pushes us to broaden our own conceptions and practices of analysis.