Minimal metaphysics or minimal anti-metaphysics?
Wann
9. bis 10. September 2022
9:45 bis 16:45 Uhr
Wo
Bischofsvilla, Otto-Adam-Straße 5, 78467 Konstanz
Veranstaltet von
Dr. Tobias Henschen, University of Konstanz
Vortragende Person/Vortragende Personen:
Dr. Tobias Henschen, Andreas Hüttemann, Nicholas Emmerson, Alyssa Ney, James Ladyman, Michael Esfeld, Majid Beni, Anjan Chakravartty, Michela Massimi
Funded by: Thyssen-Stiftung, Universität Konstanz, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftsphilosophie
Description
Loosely following some basic ideas introduced by Chakravartty, let us say that philosophers of science engage in maximal metaphysics if they explain the content, experience, or practice of science in terms of unobservable entities, and if they endorse positions of metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic realism about these entities and observable entities, i.e. if they believe that these entities exist independently of the content, experience, or practice of science (metaphysical realism), that their explanations are (approximately) true (semantic realism), and that we can come to know that these explanations are true (epistemic realism). Let us also say that philosophers of science engage in maximal anti-metaphysics if they refuse to explain the content, experience, or practice of science in terms of unobservable entities; if they endorse a position of metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic realism about observable entities; and if they refuse to endorse a position of metaphysical, semantic, or epistemic realism about unobservable entities. Then standard scientific realists, Humeans and anti-Humeans qualify as maximal metaphysicians, and then logical empiricists and constructive empiricists qualify as maximal anti-metaphysicians.
An interesting fact about recent work in the metaphysics of science is that many authors endorse (anti-)metaphysical positions that are minimal in some sense. Let us say that philosophers of science engage in minimal metaphysics if they explain the content, experience, or practice of science in terms of a limited range of unobservable entities, or if they endorse a position of metaphysical and epistemic realism about these entities, but no position of semantic realism. Let us also say that philosophers of science engage in minimal anti-metaphysics if they explain the content, experience or practice of science in terms of unobservable entities, if they reject positions of metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic realism about these entities and observable entities, and if they endorse positions of metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic anti-realism about these entities: if they believe that these entities are phenomenal entities, i.e. entities that do not exist independently of the content, experience, or practice of science (metaphysical anti-realism), that their explanations are true in the sense of corresponding to phenomenal entities (semantic anti-realism), and that we can come to know whether these explanations are true in this sense (epistemic anti-realism).
Positions of minimal (anti-) metaphysics have moved closer to the (perhaps imaginary) line separating metaphysics (or realism) and anti-metaphysics (or anti-realism). But there are several questions that stand in need of discussion:
- Does metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic realism about a limited range of unobservable entities qualify as “minimal” metaphysics?
- Is it possible to endorse metaphysical and epistemic realism without endorsing semantic realism?
- Does minimal metaphysics collapse into maximal metaphysics or minimal anti-metaphysics?
- Does minimal anti-metaphysics collapse into maximal anti-metaphysics or minimal metaphysics?
- Would it make sense to interpret explanations of the content, experience, or practice of science in terms of dispositions, objective modal structure or the wave function as coordinating (or “transcendental”) principles?
- Would it make sense to understand dispositions, objective modal structure or the wave function as phenomenal entities?
- Can we make sure that the dependence of phenomenal entities on the content, experience, or practice of science is epistemic or semantic, rather than ontological?
The goal of the workshop is to discuss these and similar questions.
Program
Friday, September 9, 2022
09:45 – 10:00 Opening
10:00 – 11:15 Andreas Hüttemann, University of Cologne: A Role for Inference to the Best Explanation in the Metaphysics of Science
11:30 – 12:45 Nicholas Emmerson, University of Birmingham: Metaphysics and the Problem of Progress
14:00 – 15:15 Alyssa Ney, University of California at Davis: Physicalism and Metaphysics
15:30 – 16:45 James Ladyman, University of Bristol: Scientific Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality
17:00 – 18:15 Michael Esfeld, University of Lausanne: Super Humeanism: Minimalist Ontology and Scientific Realism
Saturday, September 10, 2022
10:00 – 11:15 Majid Beni, Middle East Technical University, Ankara: Scientific Metaphysics and the Problem of Scientific Progress
11:30 – 12:45 Tobias Henschen, University of Konstanz: Scientific realism, neo-Kantianism, and truth
14:00 – 15:15 Anjan Chakravartty, University of Miami: Blending the Phenomena and Noumena
15:30 – 16:45 Michela Massimi, University of Edinburgh: Perspectivism, a Primer