George Bealer: “A New Theory of Concepts and the A Priori”
The guiding idea is that the link between concepts and a priori knowledge could not be more fundamental: the very identity conditions of concepts can be specified in terms of the possibility of associated a priori knowledge. Such a theory is central, not just to modal epistemology, but also to philosophy of language and mind. On this theory, lying between properties, which have coarse-grained identity conditions, and complex concepts, which have fine-grained identity conditions, there is a category of simple concepts (simple in the way properties are simple: they have no logical form in any sense) whose identity conditions are of an intermediate granularity: the identity of simple concepts consists in a certain associated possibility of a priori knowledge of their necessary equivalence. After outlining the theory, I describe how it promises to provide solutions to various issues in modal epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind (the necessary a posteriori, Frege’s Puzzle, serious publicity, concept application, etc.).
David Chalmers: “Concepts and the Scrutability of Truth”
Given sufficient information about the world, we are in a position to know what our expressions and concepts refer to, and whether our beliefs and utterances are true. I call these theses the scrutability of reference and the scrutability of truth. I will formulate these theses in a precise and nontrivial form, and will argue for their plausibility. I will then argue that the theses have significant consequences for the analysis of concepts, and in particular for understanding the relationship between concepts, content, apriority, and inferential role.
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero: “A Priori Knowledge in Understanding Demonstratives”
Kripkean examples of alleged contingent a priori truths are good cases to study relations between a priori knowledge and knowledge required for understanding, or concept-possession. In my talk, I will outline a general account of what is required for understanding demonstratives, applicable both to perceptual and anaphoric cases, and I will use it to discuss cases of the contingent a priori involving demonstratives, intending the lessons to apply in general. I will argue for a deflationary, two-dimensional account on which the proper objects of both modalities differ. I will discuss in this way the requirements, in addition to linguistic understanding, for accessing the *de re* contents regarding which a priori justification is correctly considered problematic in those cases.
David Henderson: “Concepts and How to Make Them Talk”
I begin by laying out several anchor points characterizing what little I understand about concepts–those semantic eentities preserved in good translation. While this falls short of a satisfactory philosophical theory of concepts, it provides an adequate basis for an epistemological account of the a priori. The account seems at first to take a rather traditional form: at least one form of a priori justification, one that has served as a model instance and that is exemplified in philosophical reflection turns on coming to appreciate conceptually grounded necessary truths by drawing on one's competence with the concepts involved. In coming to possess the relevant concepts, one must come to acquire a sensitivity to certain elements of the concepts – certain components of their semantics (though not all), and this sensitivity provides the basis for philosophical reflection. However, when I begin to flesh out this account, there arise certain highly revisionary elements: notably, that, while this reflection can be done "from the armchair" and draws only on what are the most direct and reliable yields of one's conceptual competence, the inquiry as a whole must have a two-stage structure with an ineliminable empirical element. In the first stage, judgments in response to concrete scenarios provide a kind of evidence for later generalization. These are the presumptive deliverances of competence–but such judgments must ultimately be recognizeed as a rather mixed bag. The second stage involves a kind of abductive inference that cannot be understood as high-grade a priori.
Ruth Millikan: “On the Epistemology of Concepts”
Quine is right that there is no (a priori knowable) analytic/synthetic distinction, no (a priori knowable) demarcation line between conceptual truths and empirical truths. All concepts, including logical concepts, are tested for adequacy through experience. My arguments for this thesis are decidedly unQuinean however. They spring from an entirely different theory of concepts. The general position is strongly externalist. Having adequate concepts of things in the world involves bearing certain external relations, certain space-time-causal relations, to those things. But one’s space-time-causal relations to things in the world are not knowable a priori, so neither is the adequacy of one’s concepts. That one’s concepts are non-equivocal, non-redundant and non-empty is discovered only through experience in making judgments employing these concepts. And it is gained only inductively, hence is never entirely certain. What one gains through conceptual analysis is only what has previously been inductively acquired through experience. Similarly, we have only a posteriori knowledge about what we ourselves believe (in part) because we have only a posterior knowledge that our apparent beliefs are real beliefs, beliefs about things in the real world, rather than mere apparitions of beliefs. The externalist challenge is to give an account of the external relations that make concepts and thoughts non-empty and clear and to explain HOW the adequacy versus inadequacy of our concepts is evidenced in experience. I’ll sketch the position on these matters that I advocate. (I can’t actually do this: It’s taken several books. But perhaps I can give some sense of the program. There will be very very numerous yawning gaps!)
Nenad Miscevic: “Empirical Concepts and A Priori Truth”
The thesis to be argued is the following. Our merely conceptual knowledge (not based on specific sensitivity to the referential domain) is either weakly and superficially a priori, or downright a posteriori. Starting from the fact that some of our definitions (or concepts) are recognizably empirically established, we argue that recognizably empirical grounding yields superficial a priority. Further some (first-order) concept analysing propositions are empirically false about their referents and thus empirically refutable. Therefore, our empirical definitions (or concepts) are fallible and empirically revisable: they can turn out to be incorrect about the intended satisfiers of the concept defined, and their concept analyzing propositions to be false. Now, empirical revisability is incompatible with strong apriority (and entails at best a weak a priority or a posteriority). The result is quite shocking: Analyticity does not entail a priority.
Albert Newen: “Perception-based Concepts and A Priori Knowledge”
I assume that a theory of concepts has to distinguish between perception-based, proposition-based and theory-based concepts. The first aim of this paper is to present and defend an epistemic theory of concepts. This will be done by discussing the cognitive abilities of animals. On the basis of this theory there will be presented a detailed list of criteria of having perception-based concepts.
A cognitive system can have a perception-based concept of the property A1 only:
- if the system has a stable representation of A1 while dealing with very different objects and
- if the system represents not only the property A1 but also some (but at least one) other properties A2§An of the same oobject - while the other properties are not the determinable or general categories under which the property A1 can be subsumed,
- if there is a relative stimulus independence such that the representation of A1 cannot only be produced by characteristic stimuli but also in situations in which, in addition to this, a neutral stimulus (e.g. a learned acoustic signal) is necessary,
- if the property of A1 is represented as an instance of the dimension/determinable B and not as an instance of an incorrect dimension.
The general view I am proposing is a modern version of concept empiricism (in line with the work of Jesse Prinz 2002). The second aim of the paper is to answer the question whether such theory of concepts leaves any space left for a priori knowledge? The general answer is ‘Yes’. Although all human concepts are finally based on abstractions from perceptions, we have a priori knowledge: 1. In the case of perception-based concepts, e.g. in the case of the concept red, a cognitive system only has a concept of being red if it categorizes red as an instantiation of the determinable colour. Therefore, we can attribute the a priori knowledge that red is a colour to a cognitive system if it has the concept of being red. 2. Proposition-based and theory-based concepts are holistic in nature, i.e. to have them a cognitive system must know a class of characteristic propositions – respectively an essential part of the releevant theory. In such a class of propositions which are characteristic for the concept, there is usually at least one proposition included which is treated as definitional. Therefore, we can attribute this definitional proposition as a priori knowledge to the cognitive system which has a proposition-based or theory-based concept.
David Papineau: “Two-Dimensional Semantics and Physicalism”
I shall lay out the abstract structure of the 'two-dimensional semantics’ argument against mind-brain physicalism, and then use this as a framework to evaluate some more familiar anti-physicalist arguments: Max Black's argument, Kripke’s argument, the argument from the ‘a priori characterization of physicalism’, an argument from reference fixation. By evaluating these more familiar arguments, we will be able to cast light ont he strengths and weaknesses of the two-dimensional framework.
Scott Sturgeon: “Concepts and the A Priori”
It is natural to say that concepts forge a link between epistemology and metaphysics. But some take the natural to extremes. They say that concepts forge an infallible link from ideal a priori reflection to the world. They say that when a concept is applied in such reflection, the world is guaranteed to match the result. In turn they use this idea to establish realism about number, property, proposition and the like; and they use it again to found the epistemology of such realism. Yet it's a tough row to hoe. For the line relies on a perfect fit between epistemology and metaphysics. I explain the line and its worrisome commitment. And I argue that infallibilism about modality is beset by the same commitment.